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NOTE
OBLIGATIONS

-

JOINT ADVENTURES

-

ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL

EVIDENCE To SHOW INTEREST IN PROFITS
FROM SALE OF IMMOVABLES

Plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral joint adventure under which each party was to advance an equal sum for
speculation in mineral interests, using geophysical information
furnished by one plaintiff. Defendant, allegedly relying on such
information and unknown to plaintiffs, bought a mineral lease
with his own funds, naming himself lessee. Defendant later
sold the lease at a considerable profit and refused to tender the
plaintiffs' respective shares as co-adventurers. 1 Plaintiffs instituted suit for an accounting, contending defendant had breached
the contract of joint adventure. Defendant entered an exception
of no right or no cause of action, urging that parol evidence
could not be used to prove an oral agreement of joint adventure,
the object of which was to share in the profits realized from
the acquisition and sale of immovable property. 2 The trial court
sustained the exception and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed. 8 The Louisiana Supreme Court, on rehearing, reinstated the judgment of the trial
court. Held, parol evidence is not admissible to prove a joint
adventure to share in profits realized from the sale of a mineral lease. Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963).
Statutory provisions requiring certain contracts be evidenced
in writing have continually provoked many problems for the
legal profession 1. The

parties

not the least of which concern oral joint ad-

originally put

up $20,000

each for a total

investment of

$60,000. Of this sum, over $46,000 had been used to acquire certain other mineral royalties. The exact amount expended by defendant on his lease purchase is
not given, but the court said it "was obtained at a cost substantially less than

the amount thereto expended for the royalty purchases." Hayes v. Muller, 245
La. 356, 362, 158 So. 2d 191, 193 (1963). The lease purchase was made on
October 16, 1953, and sold by defendant on December 10, 1959, for $900,000.

2. Under LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) (as amended, La. Acts 1950, No. 6) mineral interests are classified as incorporeal immovables. See note 34 infra.
3. Hayes v. Muller, 146 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The court of
appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court but on rehearing certain ques-

tions were certified to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court treated the case
as if it had been appealed directly to it since the record accompanied the certification. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 25; Grand v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 241 La.
733, 131 So. 2d 46 (1961) ; Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 8 WEsT's
LA. STAT. ANN. rule 12, § 4 (Supp. 1963).
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venture. Under French law the value of the contract is the controlling criterion for determining the admissibility of parol,
and the general rule is that only written evidence is admissible 4
to prove a contract if the value of its object exceeds a minimum
sum. 5 A similar rule applies to partnership contracts." These
prohibitions on parol are premised on the theory that a writing
is a more reliable form of proof than oral testimony 7 which is
fraught with dangers of careless observation, faulty memory,
and dishonesty.8 Oral evidence, however, is admissible to prove
contracts exceeding this minimum sum whenever there is a commencement of proof by a writing emanating from the person
against whom the claim is made 9 or whenever it was not feasible for the creditor to secure the written proof.'0 There are no
special rules barring admission of parol evidence merely because
an immovable is involved. These French Code provisions were
not adopted in Louisiana. Conversely, the articles in the Louisiana Civil Code precluding proof of sales or transfers of immovables by parol evidence were not contained in the Code Napoleon
but were devised by the redactors of the Louisiana Codes of
1808 and 1825.11 Since the French approach to the requirement
4. FRENCH CIVL CODE art. 1341, at 246, n. d (Wright's transl. 1908).
5. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1341, as amended by Law of Feb. 21, 1948.

The

current sum is 50 new francs. See id. art. 1341, at 535, n.1 (Dalloz ed. 1961).
6. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1834, as amended by Law of Feb. 21, 1948. Under
the Code Napoleon the minimum sum was 150 francs. The present article sets
the minimum sum at 50 new francs. Under modern French law there is a crucial
distinction between joint adventures or partnerships with a "civil purpose" and
those with a "commercial purpose" which affects the admission of evidence of
proof of the contract to form such a venture. A joint adventure or partnership

with a "civil purpose" is subject to the Civil Code (id. arts. 1325, 1341, 1834,
1838) in that if it involves a sum of more than 50 new francs, it must be constituted by a written agreement and parol evidence is inadmissible to prove the

agreement's existence or contents. Id. art. 1341. If the joint adventure or partnership is of a commercial nature, it is subject to the Commercial Code (FRENCH
COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 50, 90) and requires no more than an oral agreement.
CHURCH, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS UNDER FRENCH LAW § 134 (1960).
A discussion of the elements of this distinction is beyond the scope of this Note.
7. See 12 AuBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 762 (5th ed. 1922); 13
See
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITIt DES OBLIGATIONS no 2564 (1905).
generally Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
8. See 12 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS n 761 (5th ed. 1922); 14
See
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITt DES OBLIGATIONS no 2517 (1905).
generally Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
9. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1347. See also 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
(AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1117
(1959). See generally Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
10. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1348. See also 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
(AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no.

1117 (1959). Examples wherein securing of written evidence is not feasible are
said to be the necessary deposit, obligations contracted in case of unforeseen
accident, deposit of baggage in a hotel by a traveler, and hiring of domestics.
Id. no. 1119. See generally Comment, 3 LA. L. REV. 427 (1941).
11. See notes 20 and 23 infra.

1964]

NOTE

279

of proof by writing was not adopted by Louisiana, the French
law will be of little help to the Louisiana courts in this area.
The common law rules, however, appear to provide a more fruitful analogy.
Under the historic statute of frauds of common law jurisdictions certain contracts are enforceable only if evidenced in writing and signed by the party against whom the action is
brought. 12 The purpose of this requirement apparently is to prevent the enforcement of unfounded or fraudulent claims through
perjured testimony."' One contract to which the statute of
frauds is applicable is that for the sale of an interest in land. 1 4
It has long been recognized, however, that oral agreements of
partnership or joint adventure are valid although the parties intend to own or deal in real estate.I 5 Courts have explained this
view in two ways: some have relied on the finding of an implied fiduciary duty, the breach of which gives rise to a con12. The original Statute

of Frauds is the English statute, An Act for the

Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 1676, 29 CAR. 2, ch. 3. However, the term
"statute of frauds" is descriptive of all statutes which require certain classes of
contracts to be in writing, such statutes being largely modelled after the original
English statute. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 278 (1950); 49 AM. Jun. Statute of
Frauds §§ 1, 2 (1943) ; 37 C.J.S. Statute of Frauds §§ 1, 2 (1943).
Under common law there is a distinction between the statute of frauds and
the "parol evidence rule." The statute of frauds makes certain oral contracts
unenforceable if not reduced to a signed memorandum; the "parol evidence rule"
protects a completely integrated writing from being varied and contradicted by
parol testimony. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 575 (1951).
It appears that the Louisiana Civil Code follows this same basic distinction
but confusion is created by the courts' indiscriminate use of the term "parol
evidence rule" to encompass both the requirement of writing for certain contracts
and the prohibition against varying the terms of a written contract. Compare
LA. CIviL, CoDa

arts. 2275, 2440 (1870)

with LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2276 (1870).

For a comprehensive discussion of the latter rule, see Comment, 3 LA. L. REV.
427 (1941).
13. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275 (1950); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 448
(3d ed. 1957) ; 49 Am. Jua. Statute of Frauds § 1 (1943) ; 37 C.J.S. Statute of
Frauds § 1 (1943).
14. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 450 (3d ed. 1957). The RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs § 1.78(.) (1932) provides: "The following classes of informal contracts
are by statute unenforceable unless there is a written memorandum thereof
signed by the party against whom enforcement of the contract is sought, or by
some person thereunto authorized by him : . . . Class IV. Contracts for the sale
of an interest in land."
15. This general position was set forth in the frequently cited English case
of Dale v. Hamilton, 5 Hare 369, 67 Eng. Rep. 955 (1846) and has been generally recognized in the United States as the majority view. See cases collected
in 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 411, n.41 (1950); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 489,
n.15 (3d ed. 1957) ; Annots., 18 A.L.R. 484 (1922), 95 A.L.R. 1242 (1935).
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 193, illus. 6, provides: "A orally promises B to
share with him whatever proceeds A obtains from the sale of Blackacre. A's
promise is not within Class IV"
(of § 178, note 14 supra, requiring, writing
to be enforceable).
F'or the minority view, see Annots., 18 A.L.R. 484, 497 (1922), 95 A.L.R.

1242, 1246 (1935).
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structive trust for the benefit of co-adventurers;16 others have
followed the view that because of the confidential relationship
existing between co-adventurers, proceeds from the sale of the
real estate are considered personal property and the action to
collect a share of the proceeds thus falls outside any prohibition
of the statute of frauds.17 That the agreement involved a mineral interest has likewise generally proved no bar to a co-adventurer's recovery. 18
Adopting an approach somewhat similar to the common law
and apparently following the policy of protecting title to immovables from fraud, 19 Louisiana Civil Code articles 2440 and
2275 require sales and other transfers of immovables to be in
writing; 20 and it is well settled in the jurisprudence that title
16. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUsTEEs § 488 (2d ed. 1960); 2 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 437.1 (1959).
See also 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 499
(2d ed. 1956) where it is pointed out that courts holding to the contrary fail
to recognize that a fiduciary relation can arise without a contract, and that a
constructive trust may be imposed where a fiduciary, in violation of his duty,
acquires and seeks to retain the property to which the fiduciary duty relates.
It has been pointed out that from a theoretical viewpoint there can be no
constructive trusts in a civil law system (Patton, Future of Trust Legislation
in Latin America, 20 TUL. L. REV. 542, 548 (1946)), and that even after the
passage of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act, there can be no constructive trusts
in Louisiana (Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law Based on the Restatement and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates Act, 13 TUL. L. REV. 70,
83 (1938)). But ef. Gaines v. Chew, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 619, 650 (1844) (constructive or implied trusts are not prohibited by Louisiana law) and cases which
indicate that constructive or implied trusts are a part of Louisiana law, e.g.,

Succession of Onorato, 219 La. 1, 51 So. 2d 804 (1951) ; Sentell v. Richardson,
211 La. 288, 29 So. 2d 852 (1947) ; Haynesville Oil Co. v. Beach, 159 La. 615,
105 So. 790 (1925); Jansen v. Bellamore, 147 La. 900, 86 So. 324 (1920);
McClendon v. Bradford, 42 La. Ann. 160, 7 So. 78 (1890) ; Exchange & Banking
Co. v. Yorke, 4 La. Ann. 138 (1849) ; Gervais v. Gervais, 9 Orl. App. 69 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1911). In the official comment to LA. R.S. 9:1722 (1950), as
amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 338, it is pointed out that the 1964 Trust Code
"does not treat constructive trusts and does not affect the Louisiana jurisprudence on constructive trusts. See a'scal, Some ABC's About Trusts and Us,
13 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (1953)."
17. Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 211 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Stewart v.
Young, 247 Mich. 451, 226 N.W. 222 (1929) ; Annot., 18 A.L.S. 484, 490 (1922).
18. Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 211 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1954) ; Kasishke
v. Keppler, 158 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1947); 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW § 437.1 (1959) ; Annots., 18 A.L.R. 484, 492 (1922), 95 A.L.R. 1242,

1244 (1935).
19. See Hackenburg v. Gartskamp, 30 La. Ann. 898 (1878); Jackson v.
Harris, 136 So. 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2440 (1870) : "All sales of immovable property shall
be by authentic act or act under private signature.

"Except as provided in article 2275, every verbal sale of immovables shall be
null, as well for third persons as for the contracting parties themselves, and
testimonial proof of it shall not be admitted."

Id. art. 2275: "Every transfer of immovable property must be in writing;
but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property, be made, it shall be
good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee, who confesses it when
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to immovables cannot be established by parol evidence.2 1 Likewise it has been held consistently that a principal cannot prove
an oral mandate for the purpose of establishing an interest in
immovable property purchased by his alleged agent. 22 Where
a partnership's assets consist of immovable property, article
23
2836 requires the partnership agreement to be in writing.
Joint adventures, which differ from partnerships by reason of
their informal nature, have been defined as a special combination of two or more persons who jointly seek a profit through
a specific adventure.24 While joint adventures are subject to
the general rules of partnership by analogy only, 25 there is no
clear authority as to whether article 2836 applies to joint ad26
ventures.
interrogated on oath, provided actual delivery has been made of the immovable
property thus sold."
There are no corresponding articles in the Code Napoleon insofar as immovables are concerned. The Louisiana articles were incorporated into the Code
of 1808 with no comment by the redactors. See 3 LoUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES,
COMPILED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA arts. 2440, 2275 (1942).
The jurisprudence has made the rules relative to sales and transfers likewise
applicable to contracts to sell or to transfer. Patterson v. Bloss, 4 La. 374
(1832).
21. Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 219 La. 264, 52 So. 2d 847 (1951) ; Carter
v. Loeber, 177 La. 444, 148 So. 673 (1933) ; Dance v. Craighead, 134 La. 6,
63 So. 604 (1913) ; Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Green, 124 La. 171, 50 So. 1
(1909) ; Halsey v. Sandidge & Payne, 27 La. Ann. 198 (1875). Generally the
rule is relaxed only in cases of manifest fraud or error. LeBleu v. Savoie, 109
La. 680, 33 So. 729 (1903) ; cf. Hodge v. Hodge, 151 La. 134, 92 So. 612
(1922) ; Maskey v. Johnson, 122 La. 791, 48 So. 266 (1909). But, even where
fraud or error is alleged, title may not be shown in one who never had title.
Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938).
22. Stierle v. Kaiser, 45 La. Ann. 580, 12 So. 839 (1893) ; Perrault v.
Perrault, 32 La. Ann. 635 (1880) ; Hackenburg v. Gartskamp, 30 La. Ann. 898
(1878). See also Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938) ; Hanby
v. Texas Co., 140 La. 189, 72 So. 933 (1916). But see Cuggy v. Zeller, 132 La.
222, 61 So. 209 (1913).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2836 (1870): "If any part of the stock of this
partnership consist of real estate, it must be in writing, and made according to
the rules prescribed for conveyance of real estate ..
"
There was no corresponding article in the Code Napoleon. Article 2836 was
incorporated into the Code of 1825 with no comment by the redactors. See 3
LOUISIANA

LEGAL ARCHIVES,

COMPILED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOU-

ISIANA art. 283( (1942).
There would appear to be no ambiguity in the article insofar as to what the
word "it" in the article refers. The original French version of the Code of 1825
clearly shows that "it" refers to the papers drawing up the partnership. "Si
quelqu6 partie du fonds social consiste en immeubles, la socidt doit 6tre rddigde
par dcrit et 8uivant les regles prescrites pour l'alidnatioan des immeubles, et elle
doit 6tre enregistrde, comme il est dit ci-aprds relativement aux socidtds en
commandite." Ibid.
24. McCann v. Todd, 203 La. 631, 14 So. 2d 469 (1943) ; Emerson v. Shirley,
188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937) ; Daily States Pub. Co. v. Uhalt, 169 La. 893,
126 So. 228 (1930) ; Young v. Reed, 192 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). See
generally Comment, 25 TUL. L. REV. 382 (1951).
25. See Comment, 25 TUL. L. REV. 382 (1951); cf. Ludeau v. Avoyelles
Cotton Co., 164 La. 275, 113 So. 846 (1927).
26. It has been suggested that in Louisiana the partnership is considered to
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While parol is not admissible to establish title to an immovable, nevertheless Louisiana courts have recognized that where
title to an immovable is only collaterally involved admission of
parol is proper.2 7 Thus, even though a principal may not assert
an interest by parol in an immovable purchased by his alleged
agent, parol is admissible to show that the agent received funds
from the principal for which he must account. 28 Difficulty is
be a legal entity whereas a joint adventure is merely an aggregate of individual
members. Comment, 25 TUL. L. REv. 382, 393 (1951). In the instant case it
would appear that the theory underlying article 2836 would thus not be applicable since ownership of the mineral leases would not vest in an artificial
legal entity, the existence of which would have to be in writing to support ownership of an immovable. Since the instant case on rehearing did not base its holding on article 2836, the question evidently remains unanswered.
27. Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960) (to show when
assignment and sale consummated) ; Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 219 La. 264,
52 So. 2d 847 (1951) (to show joint adventure and not sale of timber intended) ;
Warnock v. Roy, 217 La. 224, 46 So. 2d 251 (1950) (to show joint adventure
to share in profits from drilling oil well) ; Dejean v. Whisenhunt, 191 La. 608.
186 So. 43 (1938) (to show joint adventure to speculate in a mineral lease);
Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937) (to show joint adventure
to speculate in mineral leases) ; Whatley v. McMillan, 152 La. 978, 94 So. 905
(to recover broker's commission on real estate sale) ; Levy v. Ward,
(1922)
33 La. Ann. 1033 (1881) (to correct an error in description of land) ; Grevenberg v. Borel, 25 La. Ann. 530 (1873) (to prove when timber cut) ; Barataria
(to show possession)
& Lafourche Canal Co. v. Field, 17 La. 421 (1841)
McGuire v. Amelung, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 649 (La. 1823) (to show possession)
Boudreau v. Boudreau, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 667 (La. 1823) (to show possession)
Molero v. The California Co., 145 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (to prove
offer in contract) ; Jones v. Jones, 126 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) (to
determine improper commission) ; Byrd v. J. F. Meeks Lumber Co., 158 So. 701
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) (to show trust relationship) ; Landry v. Blache, 17
La. App. 670, 137 So. 208 (Orl. Cir. 1931) (to recover broker's commission).
But see Stack v. DeSoto Properties, 221 La. 384, 59 So. 2d 428 (1952) ; Succession of Prescott, 170 La. 233, 127 So. 611 (1930) ; Paterson v. Bloss, 4 14. 374
(1832).
There has been no clear enunciation of what constitutes a "collateral effect"
on title to immovables in the cases that have followed this doctrine. In Amerada
Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943) a
concursus proceeding was brought to determine ownership of a fund representing
royalties under certain oil leases. The court was faced with the problem whether
the location of the source of funds was the proper place to bring suit. The court
found that the location of the oil well was proper since adjudication of title to
the property was necessary to determine ownership of the profits: "The oil is
located in the parish of St. Martin, and in order to determine the ownership of
the funds derived from the oil produced therefrom, it is necessary to determine
the ownership of the property on which the well is located." Id. at 487, 14 So. 2d
at 66. It is submitted that this test should be limited to its facts since the oil is
produced from the immovable itself, but such an interest in the immovable is
not necessary to be shown to obtain an accounting for profits derived pursuant
to a fiduciary agreement. The dissent in the instant case on rehearing said:
"(T]he basis of the joint adventure contract was profits to be derived from the
pooling of knowledge, know-how, and capital in oil and gas royalty and leasing
transactions. The acquisition of title in . . . any . . . person's name was only
incidental, collateral to and a means of accomplishing the main object of the
joint adventure agreement which was the dividing of profits derived ultimately
as a result of the pooling of their knowledge, know-how, and capital." 245 La.
at 385, 158 So. 2d at 201 (1963).
28. Little v. Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964) ; Scurto v. LeBlanc,
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encountered, however, when the principal seeks to require the
agent to account for the profits made from the investment of
such funds in immovable property. 29 In Succession of Prescott"°

the plaintiffs attempted to show by parol that one of the defendants (a brother) had acquired certain immovable property in
his own name, but that in so doing he was acting as the agent

of the mother and used money which had been entrusted to him
to invest for her. Prior to his mother's death the defendant had
sold the property and retained all the funds derived from the

sale. By their action, plaintiffs (as heirs of their mother)
sought to obtain an accounting for the revenues derived from
the property while it was still in his name and to receive their
share of the proceeds which had been realized from the sale.
The court held that since plaintiffs were prohibited from using
parol evidence to show title in their mother they could not be

heard to demand an accounting of either the revenues from the
property or any part of the proceeds derived from the sale

thereof.8 '
In the area of joint adventure, analogous to that of the principal-agent, 2 the only cases found dealing with the admissibility of parol to prove the adventure wherein mineral leases or
royalties were involved8 8 were decided under the law as it stood

prior to the 1938 statute classifying mineral interests as incorporeal immovables (now R.S. 9:1105),34 but the opinions, never191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938).
29. Compare Cuggy v. Zeller, 132 La. 222, 61 So. 209 (1913) with Succession
of Prescott, 170 La. 233, 127 So. 611 (1930). See also Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191
La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938).
30. 170 IA. 233, 127 So. 611 (1930).
31. The court in Prescott cited no authority for this proposition. It is submitted that a distinction should have been drawn between the situations where
the purported principal seeks to obtain an interest in the immovable itself
(which was not the case in Prescott), and the situation where the purported
principal seeks only a share of the profits made pursuant to the agreement
(which was the case in Prescott). In the former situation parol should not be
admissible since title to the immovable is sought to be established; in the latter
situation there should be no objection to parol evidence since title to the immovable is not in any way involved. See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra.
32. The court in the instant case assumed that the principal-agent cases
were controlling in refusing to allow parol on rehearing. Further, there is
clearly a similar fiduciary relationship in both areas. See text accompanying
notes 51-52 infra.
33. Dejean v. Wisenhunt, 191 La. 608, 186 So. 43 (1938); Emerson v.
Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937).
34. La. Acts 1938, No. 205, now LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950), as amended, La.
Acts 1950, No. 6: "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and contracts applying to
and affecting these leases or the right to reduce oil, gas, or other minerals to
possession, together with the rights, privileges, and obligations resulting therefrom
are classified as real rights and incorporeal immovable property. They may be
asserted, protected, and defended in the same manner as may be the ownership
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theless, contain significant reasoning. In Emerson v. Shirley"
the plaintiff, alleging fraud by a co-adventurer, sued to annul
a sale of a royalty interest to the latter. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that parol could not be used to
prove an oral joint adventure since the object of the adventure
was the ownership of immovables and under article 2836 such
an agreement must be in writing.36 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that parol was admissible on the ground that
the oral testimony would merely establish the confidential relationship of the parties and not the joint ownership of the property.327 The rationale was that the effect of the parol on the
title to the property would be collateral only, and this would not
prevent the admission of evidence relevant for some other purpose -to
show a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by a coor possession of other immovable property by the holder of these rights, without

the concurrence, joinder, or consent of the landowner, and without impairment
of rights of warranty, in any action or by any procedure available to the owner
of immovable property or land. This Section shall be considered as substantive
as well as procedural so that the owners of oil, gas, and other mineral leases

and contracts within the purpose of this section shall have the benefit of all laws
relating to the owners of real rights in immovable property or real estate."
Prior to the adoption of this statute, oil, gas, and mineral leases were held
to confer only personal rights (Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171
So. 846 (1936)), but since this afforded a mineral lessee little protection, the
statute was enacted giving a mineral lessee a real right on his lease. Although
subsequent cases interpreting the statute produced much confusion, it is generally
accepted now that such mineral contracts confer real rights that are both substantive and procedural, thus affording the holders of such contracts the same
remedies that belong to owners of corporeal immovables. Comment, 35 TUL. L.
REv. 218 (1960). But see the recent cases of Harwood Oil & Refining Co. v.
Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764 (1960) ; Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations,
Inc., 239 La. 23, 117 So. 2d 897 (1960) ; Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105
So. 2d 210 (1958). It is generally held now, however, that ownership of a
mineral interest may not be created by parol. Acadian Prod. Corp. v. Tennant,
222 La. 653, 63 So. 2d 343 (1953); Davidson v. Midstates Oil Corp., 211 La.
882, 31 So. 2d 7 (1947) ; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. R. 0. Roy & Co., 196
La. 121, 198 So. 768 (1940) ; cf. Ingolia v. Lobrano, 244 La. 241, 152 So. 2d 7
(1963).
35. 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937).
36. It is significant that, notwithstanding the fact that the case arose and
was decided under the law as it stood prior to the 1.938 statute classifying mineral contracts as immovables, the court in Emerson treated the royalty interest
as an immovable and went to great lengths to show why title to the royalty
would not be involved by the introduction of parol to prove the oral joint adventure. In reversing, the Supreme Court did not specifically state why article 2836
was inapplicable.
37. Plaintiff had owned a record title to the royalty interest. He sued to
annul the sale of the royalty interest to defendant co-adventurer urging that the
defendant had interposed a third party to purchase the interest while withholding information as to the value of the royalty, and, further, that the sale
had occurred while plaintiff was intoxicated to such an extent as to be suffering
from a derangement of the intellect. The trial court dismissed the suit on an
exception of no cause of action. In reversing the trial court and holding that
parol was admissible to prove the original joint adventure, the Supreme Court
said that "the plaintiff has alleged such a confidential relationship . . . that he
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adventurer.3 8 Emerson was later cited with approval in a case 9
which held parol evidence admissible to show a joint adventurer's claim for a portion of the profits resulting from an
assignment of a mineral lease "since it was not the title to the
'40
real estate that was involved but merely a lease on real estate.
On first hearing of the instant case the Supreme Court,
using Emerson as a guide, held parol evidence admissible to
prove the joint adventure, reasoning that the object of the suit
was neither assertion of an interest in an oil and gas lease nor
an attack upon the title to such a lease, but, rather, the suit was
solely for "an accounting for the profits resulting from the
joint adventure which is a personal contract."' 4 1 The court

emphasized the fact that the joint adventure was not related to
the ownership of property but only to a share of the profits, and
that, not only was title to the property not affected because of
the nature of the plaintiff's demand (an accounting), but title
could not be affected by proof of the joint adventure since the
agreement provided only for a share of the profits and not for
joint ownership of the property itself. Thus, success in the
suit was dependent only upon whether the plaintiffs could prove
there was a joint adventure within the terms of which profits
were derived; therefore, code prohibitions on the admissibility
42
of parol were inapplicable.

On rehearing the court reversed its original decision, conshould be allowed to prove it by parol evidence
is offered to prove the confidential relationship
to establish the original joint ownership." 188
38. "The rule which forbids the proving of

. . . [and] . . . if parol evidence
alleged in this case it will not be
La. at 204-05, 175 So. at 911-12.
title to real estate by parol evi-

dence is not applicable to evidence which is offered for some other purpose, for
which it is relevant and competent, and which relates only collaterally and unavoidably to, and without establishing or affecting the ownership of real estate."
Id. at 205, 175 So. at 912.
39. Dejean v. Wisenhunt, 191 La. 608, 186 So. 43 (1938).
40. Id. at 610, 186 So. at 44. The court in Dejean indicated that Emerson
was followed because the case was governed by the law in effect prior to the
1938 mineral statute (LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950), quoted note 34 supra). However,
the opinion of the court of appeal in the instant case said the court in Dejean
could not have intended the implication that had the 1938 statute been applicable the parol evidence would not have been admissible because Dejean
"specifically applied the principle of the Emerson v. Shirley case, and under
that principle parol evidence would have been admissible to prove the verbal
contract of joint adventure, regardless of whether that contract was entered
before or after the enactment of the 1938 statute." Hayes v. Muller, 146 So. 2d
176, 184 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The Supreme Court in the instant case did
not mention Dejean.
41. 245 La. at 368, 158 So. 2d at 195 (1963).
42. The court on original hearing said the defendant's contention that articles
2275 and 2836 precluded parol evidence is "inapplicable because title to the
'Sweeney Lease' is not involved." Id. at 370, 158 So. 2d at 196.
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cluding that parol evidence could not be introduced to prove an
oral joint adventure providing for sharing of profits derived
from the sale of immovable property. The court reasoned that
the prohibition on the use of parol was as applicable to attempts
imto establish an interest in the proceeds from the sale of an
43
movable as it was to attempts to prove title to the same. In
support of this position the court relied in part on cases denying
recovery to a principal who sought to prove by parol evidence
an interest in an immovable purchased by his agent.44 The court
considered Succession of Prescott as controlling, reasoning that
the situation in the instant case was almost precisely the same. 45
Emerson was distinguished on its facts4

6

and the court said that

in Emerson "the sole purpose of the introduction of the parol
evidence was to show . . . [a] fiduciary relationship . . . and

not that of enforcing an agreement so as to give any benefits
flowing therefrom. '47 As an alternative reason the court concluded that, even if their factual distinction was erroneous,
Emerson "was decided in 1937 - or long prior to the legisla43. On rehearing the court re-evaluated the meaning of LA. R.S. 9:1105
(1950) and said that the prohibition against using parol evidence "applies to
transactions involving mineral leases, just as it does to those affecting real
estate." 245 La. at 376, 158 So. 2d at 198 (1963). But see discussion of the
soundness of this conclusion at notes 48-49 infra.
44. Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938) ; Carter v. Loeher,
177 La. 444, 148 So. 673 (1933); Succession of Prescott, 170 La. 233, 127 So.
611 (1930) ; Hanby v. Texas Co., 140 La. 189, 72 So. 933 (1916) ; Perrault v.
Perrault, 32 La. Ann. 635 (1880) ; Hackenburg v. Gartskamp, 30 La. Ann. 898
(1878). With the exception of Succession of Prescott, supra, the cases cited by
the court in the instant case stand only for the proposition that title to or an
interest in the title to an inmovable may not be established by parol and not for
the proposition that parol may not be used to show an obligation to account to
a principal or a co-adventurer for proceeds derived pursuant to an agreement.
While it is true that the Prescott case apparently denied to a person who advanced funds to another, used subsequently by the other to invest in immovables,
the right to use parol evidence for the purpose of showing the basic agreement
and what was done pursuant to it, the court in Prescott cited no authority for
this stated proposition. It is submitted that this holding was contrary to the
later holding in Emerson, which clearly recognized that parol evidence offered
for a similar purpose related only collaterally to the ownership of an immovable
without affecting that ownership.
45. 245 La. at 378, 158 So. 2d at 199 (1963).
46. On original hearing the court cited Emerson as the guiding authority for
admitting the disputed parol evidence of the joint adventure. On rehearing the
court pointed out that Emerson involved an action to annul a sale between coadventurers on the ground of fraud and intoxication of the vendee and that
the plaintiff had been a record owner of the disputed royalty. It is significant,
however, to note the emphasis the court in Emerson placed on the fiduciary
relationship existing between co-adventurers. Neither the Emerson case nor the
instant case on original hearing discussed the Prescott case.
47. 245 La. at 385, 158 So. 2d at 201 (1963). Query: Was this not a
fiduciary relationship in the instant case? See 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 499 (2d ed.
1956), discussed in note 16 supra.
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tive enactment placing mineral leases on the same basis of
48
realty insofar ... as parol evidence rules are concerned."
Assuming the soundness of the court's interpretation and
application of R.S. 9:1105 insofar as proof of title by parol was
involved, 49 it is questionable whether the admission of parol in
the instant case would do any violence to the rule prohibiting
proof of title to an immovable by parol since it appears that
title to the immovable was not involved. Consistent with the
prohibition against use of parol to establish title to an immovable, a contract to buy or sell an immovable must also be in
writing 0 and it follows that neither a duty to buy nor a duty
to sell an immovable may be established by parol in a suit to
recover damages for failure to fulfill such an agreement. 5' However, an action for damages for breach of an oral contract to
buy or to sell immovables should be distinguished from an oral
agreement seeking to bind an agent, who receives money from
his principal for investment pursuant to mandate, to account
to his principal for proceeds derived from performance of the
agreement. In the former, the promise sued on is to transfer
an immovable; in the latter, the promise sued on is to account
for the profits made pursuant to the agreement. If, to establish
his case, the plaintiff must prove the purchase and subsequent
sale of an immovable by the agent, written proof of the purchase and sale must be offered. However, the introduction of
parol by the principal to establish a promise to account for proceeds derived from these transactions would not in any way af48. 245 La. at 385, 158 So. 2d at 201 (1963).
intention of the 1938 statute?

Query: Was this the real

Of. Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 50, 48 So. 2d

369 (1950); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558
(1940), note 49 infra. It is significant that notwithstanding the fact that
Emerson was decided under the law as it

stood prior to the 1938 statute (now

LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950)), the court in Emerson treated the disputed royalty
interest as an immovable. See discussion note 36 supra.
49. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950), quoted note 34 supra, provides that holders and
owners of mineral interests are afforded all substantive and procedural remedies
as are available to owners of real rights in immovables. In the instant case the
defendant was not a holder and it is questionable whether the statute is applicable.
Of. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Reese, 195 La. 359, 196 So. 558 (1940)

(R.S. 9:1105 did not intend to grant to mineral lessee the same right of ownership as that of the lessor). See, to the same effect, Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 218
La. 50, 48 So. 2d 369 (1950). Query: If a mineral lessee's rights are subordinate
to those of a mineral lessor, can such a mineral lessee be said to be accorded all
real rights? In the instant case defendant was a former lessee.
50. Patterson v. Bloss, 4 La. 374 (1832).
51. Ibid. It should be noted that Patterson, cited as one authority for the
holding of the instant case, stands only for the proposition that a contract to
sell an immovable may not be established by parol evidence, and that parol is

likewise inadmissible to show breach of. such a contract to recover damages.
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fect the title of the named vendee, but would only show the
agent's indebtedness to the principal. The same distinction
would be applicable to oral joint adventures to require an accounting from a co-adventurer since similar fiduciary duties are
52
involved.
If the ruling of the instant case was based on a desire to
prevent fraud, 53 the result appears ironic since the court, in its
eagerness to protect title to immovables from fraud, has opened
the door to the equally invidious practice of one co-adventurer
breaching his fiduciary duty to the other. Furthermore, the
holding leads to the possibility that where the assets of an oral
joint adventure are movable and immovable property, one party,
by mere denial of the agreement by his co-adventurer, may be
effectively barred from establishing the joint adventure for the
purpose of a partition of the movable assets or the proceeds
realized from their sale. A similar problem arises if A and B
orally enter into a joint adventure pursuant to which B acquires
and disposes of an immovable and invests the proceeds in movable property. Under the holding of the instant case, if B could
trace the source of the funds to the immovable, B could prevent
A from claiming any part of the assets even after several transactions in movable property. Such inequities are brought into
sharper focus if the immovable is bought in direct violation of
the express terms of the agreement.
In reaching a solution in the instant case, the court, by
choosing the approach of Prescott, evidently limited the more
equitable approach of Emerson to the facts there presented. Had
the court in Hayes adhered to its original hearing, the problems
that may now arise could have been avoided. As the law presently stands under Hayes, it is difficult to see a solution to these
possible inequities without a corresponding contraction of the
rule as set forth. While the instant decision may constitute a
genuine attempt to protect the stability of title to mineral interests and thus render oil and gas transactions more certain, it
is submitted that the court actually achieved but a Pyrrhic victory. Further, it is difficult to see how protection of title can
be said to have been gained by a holding applicable to situations
52. Of. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); Cuggy V.
Zeller, 132 La. 222, 61 So. 909 (1913).
53. See the dissenting opinion of Judge FrugA in the opinion of the court
of appeal in Hayes v. Muller, 146 So. 2d 176, 186 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
See also Jackson v. Harris, 136 So. 166, 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
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wherein title is not involved, as in the instant case. It appears
obvious, however, that henceforth fiduciary duties in oral 4joint
5
adventures, common transactions in the mineral industry,
5
be largely unenforceable.

will

James S. Holliday, Jr.
54. In the instant case the court did not question the propriety of using an
oral joint adventure to deal in mineral interests since this was alleged to be the
custom of the industry. 245 La. at 363, 158 So. 2d at 193 (1963).
55. It appears the instant case has committed Louisiana to the minority
view of common law jurisdictions. See note 15 supra. In at least two other
recent decisions, parties who entered into a verbal joint adventure to deal in oil,
gas, and mineral interests were denied recovery on the basis of the instant case.
Little v. Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So. 2d 558 (1964) ; Pique v. Ingolia, 162 So. 2d
146 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). In Little, however, the court allowed recovery for
funds advanced and the value of services rendered on a quantum meruit basis.

